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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellees agree that this Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 
UTAH CODE§ 78A-4-103(2)U) (2016). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND ST AND ARD FOR REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: Did the District Court correctly determine that Defendants were not 
in breach of contract, because the terms of the Declaration were enforceable as written, 
and the Utah Condominium Act in effect at the time the lawsuit was filed did not 
invalidate those provisions denying certain interest and corresponding liabilities to 
Plaintiff? 
Standard of Review: the Appellate Court's review a trial court's legal conclusions 
for correctness. Clear Water Farms, LLCv. Giles, 2016 UT App 126, ,r 7. 
PRESERVATION: The only issue preserved for appeal is the one set forth above. 
Appellant agrees that their arguments concerning legislative changes were never 
preserved or considered by the District Court. This case is an action for breach of 
contract (namely, the Declaration). The law of the case is determined on the date of the 
filing of the Complaint by the Appellant in this case on May 12, 2014. Archer v. Utah 
State Land Board, 15 UT 2d 321, 324, 392 P.2d 622, 624. In addition, Appellant has 
provided to this Court no facts with regard to changes in the circumstances since the 2016 
Amendment. 
Consequently, the only issue that is properly before this Court on appeal is 
whether or not the District Court made the correct decision in its ruling on the original 
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motion for summary judgment applying the law and undisputed facts that existed at the 
time that judgment was entered. 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
None. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is a breach of contract case. The contract in question is the Amended © 
and Restated Declaration of Condominium and Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and 
Restrictions for Rockwell Square Condominiums recorded January 11, 2011, (the 
"Deel arati on"). 
The Plaintiff Criterium, LLC ("Criterium") purchased a tract of vacant land 
contained within the legal description of the Rockwell Square Condominiums ("Rockwell 
Square"), and then filed a lawsuit against the individual owners of residential and 
commercial units contained within Rockwell Square (the "Building 1 Owners"), as well 
as the Homeowner's Association of Rockwell Square, Inc. (the "Association") and the 
members of its management committee (the "Managers"). 
The Building 1 Owners brought a successful motion to dismiss the claims against 
them. Criterium has not appealed the judgment secured by the Building 1 Owners. The 
claims against the Managers were also dismissed on a motion for summary judgment, and 
Criterium has not included in its appeal any reference to the dismissal of those claims. 
The Association and Criterium filed cross motions for summary judgment. 
Criterium claimed that the Association was in breach of contract based on their 
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contention that the Declaration violated the provisions of the Utah Condominium Act (the 
"Act") and that Criterium was therefore entitled to certain rights that were not provided 
by the Declaration. The Association opposed Criterium's motion for summary judgment, 
but included as a counterclaim and cross motion for summary judgment that if for any 
reason Criterium was entitled to the rights that it was claiming, then with those rights 
came a corresponding liability for an equal share of the common expenses of the 
Association. The District Court denied Criterium's motion for summary judgment, ruling 
that the Declaration was enforceable as written. Consequently, the District Court also 
ruled that because Criterium did not have an interest in the common areas under the 
provision of the Declaration, it did not have the corresponding liability for common 
expenses. 
After losing the motions for summary judgment, Criterium filed a motion for 
reconsideration. In the motion for reconsideration, Criterium attacked the District 
Court's application of the case law, and Criterium presented new legal theories in an 
attempt to support the outcome that they wanted. The District Court denied Criterium' s 
motion for reconsideration on the merits. 
After the entry of final judgment, Criterium filed a notice of appeal with respect 
only to that portion of the judgment that related the Court's holding that the Declaration 
was enforceable as written. However, subsequent to the filing of the notice of appeal and 
the filing of Criterium's docketing statement, the Utah legislature enacted certain 
amendments to the Act (the "2016 Amendments"). In the brief of the Appellant, 
Criterium has essentially abandoned all of the arguments it made at the District Court 
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level in favor of arguing that the 2016 Amendments to the Act should be applied 
retroactively to alter the outcome of the litigation. In fact, the 2016 Amendments clearly ~ 
demonsJrate that the District Court's interpretation of the Act as written at the time of the 
litigation was absolutely correct. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
I. With respect to Rockwell Square, Building 1, containing 34 units has been 
constructed. Nothing else has been constructed. Moreover, Plaintiffs have expressly 
determined that they will not build any of the other buildings associated with the land 
they purchased ("Criterium units.") (Complaint, Para. 48). Therefore, the Criterium 
units do not exist now and will never exist in the future. (R. 693.] 
2. The Declaration expressly provides that there is no requirement that 
buildings 2-5 ever be constructed. (Declaration at §15.01). Moreover, in anticipation 
that buildings 2-5 may never be built, the Declaration has expressly allocated an 
undivided interest in the common areas only to Building 1 Units and no allocation has 
been made with respect to the hypothetical construction of buildings 2-5. (Declaration 
at Exhibit E). [R. 85, 110 -113.] 
3. Each of the Building 1 Owners is the owner of a condominium Unit in 
Building 1 of Rockwell Square. (Defendants' Answer, Para. 42). [R. 694.] 
4. The Association is the condominium owners association governing 
Rockwell Square. (Defendants' Answer, Para 41). [R. 694.] 
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5. Section 3.03 of the Declaration and Exhibit "E" purport to allocate 
undivided interests in the common areas of Rockwell Square only to constructed Units. 
(Declaration at §3.03). [R. 46 - 47, 110 - 113.] 
6. Section 5.01 of the Declaration states that "Memberships [in the 
Association] shall only be allocated to constructed Units, and no Membership shall be 
allocated to a unit prior to construction." (Id. at §5.01). Section 5.01 also states, "Every 
Person who is the Owner of a Unit, including Declarant, shall be subject to Assessments 
and shall be a Member of the Association." Consequently, Criterium can only be a 
member of the association to the extent that it is also subject to Assessments. [R. 53.] 
7. Criterium has failed to pay any portion of the Assessments associated with 
their recent assertion that they are entitled to a membership interest in the Association. 
(Counterclaim, Para. 45; Answer to Counterclaim, Paras. 5, 7, 8). [R. 695.] 
8. The Declaration allocates 100% of the undivided interest in the common 
areas and voting rights in the Association to the Building 1 Owners, as constituting 
100% of the constructed Units. (Declaration, sections 5.01 and 5.02 and Exhibit E 
thereto). [R. 53 - 54, 110 - 113.] 
9. Plaintiff does not own any constructed Unit. (Complaint Para. 40). [R. 
695.] 
10. · Plaintiff is the owner of record of certain undeveloped land adjacent to 
Building 1. (Complaint Para. 40 and 44). [R. 695.] 
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11. Plaintiff intends NOT to build any Unit depicted on the plat associated 
with Rockwell Square. (Complaint Para. 48). [R. 696.] 
12. Plaintiff has not participated m any meeting of the Association. 
(Complaint, Para. 42, 49-50, 53). [R. 696.] 
13. The Association and each of the Building 1 Owners has relied upon the 
actions and inactions of Plaintiff and its predecessor, including without limitation their 
failure to construct any Unit on the vacant land, their failure to claim any interest in the 
common areas and their failure to participate in any way in the Association in refraining 
from allocating a proportionate interest in the common expenses to Plaintiff and its 
predecessors; and an appropriate allocation of such common expenses to Criterium must 
be made if an interest in the common areas is allocated to Criterium. (Counterclaim, 
Paras. 47-50; Answer to Counterclaim, Paras. 7-10). [R. 696.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
It was undisputed before the District Court that the language of the Declaration 
expressly provides that there was to be no allocation of any interest in the common areas 
(:\ 
..... 
to any unconstructed unit. The sole issue presented to the District Court was whether or G 
not the Association was in breach of contract on the premise that Utah law mandated that 
the Declaration could not be enforced as it was written with respect to this single 
provision. The District Court correctly ruled that under Utah law, the drafters of the 
Declaration were entitled to enact a scheme whereby unconstructed units would not be 
allocated an interest in the common areas. Under that scheme, Criterium would not be a 
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member of the Association, would not have voting rights in the Association and would 
not be liable of assessments of its share of the common expenses until such time as their 
unconstructed J.lllits came into existence by being constructed. 
The Declaration expressly provides that once a unit is allocated an interest in the 
common areas, it becomes a member of the Association, has voting rights and must pay 
its proportionate share of the common expenses of the Association. At the District Court, 
the Defendants correctly pointed out that if the Court were to award an interest in the 
common areas to Criterium, then it must also award to the Defendants an amount 
reflecting Criterium' s liability for the assessments corresponding to its interest in the 
common areas. 
In 2016, the Utah legislature enacted a change to the Act. Under the 2016 
Amendment, the new provisions of the Act are applicable to the Declaration, even though 
the Declaration was recorded before the 2016 Amendments were enacted. Therefore, 
under the current law, Criterium does have an allocated interest in the common areas and 
it is labile for its proportionate share of common expenses. However, neither party has 
filed a new lawsuit relative to Criterium's failure to pay its assessment, and the 
Association is not in breach of any duty to recognize Criterium's interest in the common 
areas or the Association. 
The problem with Criterium's appeal is that they want to claim an interest in the 
common areas so that they can take control of the Association, but they refuse to pay 
their proportionate share of the common expenses of the Association. Under the terms of 
the Declaration, they can't have it both ways. If they own an interest in the common 
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areas then they have a liability for their proportionate share of assessments. Under the 
2016 Amendment, the same principle applies. The 2016 Amendments expressly provides ® 
that a party who has an interest in the common areas is also liable for their proportionate 
share of the common expenses. 
This Court should rule that the District Court's holding under the law of the case 
was correct. Since the lawsuit was filed, certain facts have changed. Based on the 2016 
Amendment, the Association has adopted an amendment to the Bylaws, has levied the 
appropriate assessment against Criterium, and has offered Criterium the right to 
membership in the Association and voting based on their interest in the common areas. 
This Court should direct Criterium that if it has any further dispute with the Association, 
now that all the parties agree with respect to the new law that was enacted by the 
legislature in 2016, then Criterium will need to file a new lawsuit with new factual 
allegations based on that new law and the new position of the parties. However, the new 
law can't be applied retroactively to change the outcome of cases that have already been 'i,) 
decided under prior law and the facts as they existed at the time of the complaint, as fixed 
at the time of summary judgment. 
Finally, regardless of the outcome of this appeal, the Defendants are the prevailing 
party. First, Criterium has not appealed the dismissal of its claims against the Building 1 
Owners or the Managers. Therefore, they are entitled to their attorneys' fees incurred in 
the litigation with Criterium. Likewise, the Association will be the prevailing party with 
regard to Criterium regardless to the outcome of this appeal. If the decision of the 
District Court is upheld, then the Association remains the prevailing party with regard to 
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all issues in the case. However, if the holding of the District Court is reversed, then 
Criterium is liable for the assessments pursuant to the counterclaim and motion for 
summary judgment filed by the Association, in which case the Association will be 
entitled to a substantial money judgment and the Association will still be the prevailing 
party in the case. The Declaration expressly provides in Section 17 .02 that the prevailing 
party in any action is entitled to attorneys' fees. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PROVISIONS OF THE DECLARATION ARE NOT IN DISPUTE. 
Attached as Addendum A to the Brief of Appellant, is a copy of the Declaration, 
together with various amendments thereto. The provisions of the Declaration are not in 
dispute. The parties agree that Criterium has not constructed any units associated with 
the land that they purchased. As the District Court pointed out, the definition of a "unit" 
contained within Section 1.03(ppp) of the Declaration expressly requires that a unit have 
a physical existence. Section 3.03(a) of the Declaration expressly states, "Units that have 
not yet been constructed shall not be allocated any interest in the common elements. 
Section 3.03(b) of the Declaration expressly states, "As additional buildings are 
constructed, as contemplated by this Declaration and the Plat, Declarant . . . shall file a 
Supplemental Declaration describing the re-allocated ownership interest in the common 
elements based upon the number of units in the constructed Buildings." Section 5.01 of 
the Declaration expressly provides, ''Notwithstanding the foregoing, Memberships shall 
only be allocated to constructed Units, and no Membership shall be allocated to a Unit 
prior to construction." Section 5.02(b) of the Declaration expressly states, "The votes 
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allocated to the constructed Units of the Condominium Project are equal to the Allocated 
Interests set forth in Exhibit E." Section 7.02(a) of the Declaration expressly states, "The ~ 
Association's Common Expenses shall be allocated among the Units in accordance with 
the Allocated Interest allocated to each such constructed Units .... " The parties agree 
that based on the express terms of the Declaration, no interest in the common areas was 
allocated to Criterium by the Declaration. Therefore, the Defendants were not in breach 
of the terms of the Declaration, as written, and Defendants prevailed on summary 
judgment. 
This Court is faced with the question on appeal as to whether or not the Act, in 
effect at the time that the lawsuit was filed in the District Court, prohibited the 
Declaration from allocating an interest in the common areas only to constructed Units. 
The language of the Act was mandating that "Common expenses shall be charged to ... 
the unit owners according to their respective percentage or fractional interest in the 
common areas and facilities." The only way for Criterium to avoid liability for common G.; 
expenses was to argue that it had no interest in the common areas. 
II. THE PROVISIONS OF THE DECLARATION DO NOT CONFLICT WITH THE 
ACT. 
In the case of B. Inv. LC v. Anderson, 2012 UT App 24,270 P.3d 538, Utah Court 
of Appeals expressly held that the drafter of the Declaration are entitled to "a measure of 
latitude" in drafting the provisions of the Declaration. Id. at 1 19. Criterium has not cited 
any actual holding supporting its argument that a Declaration should be construed 
differently as a result of any conflict with the Act. It was not until after the notice of 
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appeal was filed in this case that the Utah legislature enacted any amendments requiring a 
change to the Declaration. Criterium recognizes the fact that the Declaration is clear and 
unambiguous with respect to its provisions. On their motion for summary judgment, both 
of the parties argued that the Declaration was unambiguous. It was only for the first time 
on appeal that Criterium is attempting to make an argument that the Declaration might be 
ambiguous. Essentially all of Criterium' s arguments on appeal are issues it is raising for 
the first time on appeal, because they all depend upon the actions of the legislature that 
occurred after the appeal was filed. 
Freedom of contract is a fundamental concept underlying the law of 
contracts. Rawlings v. Layne & Bowler Pump Co., 93 Idaho 496,499,465 P.2d 107, 110 
( 1970). "Restrictive covenants that run with the land and encumber subdivision lots 
form a contract between subdivision property owners as a whole and individual lot 
owners .... " Swenson v. Erickson, 2000 UT 16, ,r 11; 998 P.2d 807, 810-11. As such, 
the original parties to the Declaration had the right to adopt provisions according to that 
to which there we willing to agree; and plaintiff knowingly became subject to the same 
provisions when they purchased their property with notice of the Declaration. Consistent 
with that principle, Utah Code Ann., Section 57-8-7(2) (2013) expressly states that the 
allocation of interest in the common areas shall be as set forth in the 
declaration. Similarly, Section 57-8-22 (1963), entitled "Removal of property from 
statutory provisions," allows property owners to opt out of the statutory provisions by 
unanimous action. Plaintiff consented to the terms of the Declaration when it purchased 
the property with notice of the Declaration. 
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In the present case, the Building I Owners purchased their properties with the 
understanding that they Building 1 Owners owned all of the voting rights with respect to ~ 
the Association. Reliance may prevent changes on the basis of enforcing local laws. See 
e.g., Utah County v. Young, 615 P.2d 1265, 1267 (Utah 1980) (A local government may 
be estopped from enforcing its zoning ordinances if it has "committed an act or omission 
upon which [a] developer could rely in good faith in making substantial changes in 
position or incurring extensive expenses."). 
The Utah courts have ruled that the intention of the parties is controlling in the 
interpretation of the contract, and that such intent is to be determined by the Court as a 
matter of law from the unambiguous language of the contract. Dixon v. Pro Image, 
Inc., 1999 UT 89, iiil 13-14, 987 P.2d 48. "[W]e first look to the four comers of the 
agreement to determine the intentions of the parties." Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt v. 
Bloomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). If the language within the four comers of 
the contract is unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the plain G;;; 
meaning of the contractual language, and the contract may be interpreted as a matter of 
law. Dixon, supra, 1999 UT 89 at ,I 14, ( citing Willard Pease Oil & Gas Co. v. Pioneer 
Oil & Gas Co., 899 P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 1995)); South Ridge Homeowners' Ass'n v. 
Brown, 2010 UT App 23 at ,r 1 (unambiguous terms of a declaration are enforceable in 
accordance with their plain meaning). 
The Act defers to the Declaration with respect to the Allocation of undivided 
interest in the common areas. Utah Code Ann. Section 57-8-7 (2) (2013) expressly 
states, "Each Unit Owner shall be entitled to an undivided interest in the common areas 
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and facilities in the percentages or fractions expressed in the declaration." (emphasis 
added). 
Exhibit E of the Declaration clearly and unequivocally allocates 100% of the 
interest in the common areas to the Building I Owners. Section 3.03(a) of the 
Declaration also clearly and unequivocally states that unconstructed units shall not be 
allocated any interest in the common elements. As a consequence of the express 
provisions of the Declaration, no interest in the common areas was allocated to Criterium 
prior to the date of this appeal. As a direct result thereof, Criterium has not received any 
membership in the Association, any voting rights, or been required to pay their 
proportionate share of common expenses. 
Consistent with the Act, the Declaration provides a process for reallocating 
ownership interest in the common areas. Section 3.03(b) of the Declaration requires that 
a Supplemental Declaration be recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder as the 
Criterium units are constructed. 
With respect to the strategy by which the Declaration allocates interest among the 
unit owners, the Act is permissive. Utah Code Ann. Section 58-8-7 (2) (2013) 
specifically states, "The Declaration may allocate to each unit an undivided interest and 
facilities proportionate to either the size or par value of the unit." Utah courts have 
uniformly held that the use of the word "may" is permissive. Therefore, the use of the 
word "may" clearly indicates that the authors of the Declaration were entitled to make 
the determination as to how interests in the common areas would be allocated. 
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In the present case, the drafters of the Declaration determined that interests in the 
common areas would be allocated proportionate to the actual constructed size of the 
units. Section 57-8-7 does not preclude the allocation of interests proportionate to the 
actual constructed size of the unit. In fact, the size of the units is one of the examples 
used in Section 57-8-7 to describe an appropriate alternative for allocating interest in the 
common areas. 
In the present case, the Criterium units do not have any existing size, because 
they have not been constructed. Therefore, there is no basis upon which to allocate any 
interest in the common areas to the Criterium units. In fact, the Criterium units will 
never be constructed on the basis argued by Criterium, because Criterium has stated that 
they do not intend to construct Buildings 2 through 5. We cannot know what the actual 
square footage of future units will be, until Criterium makes a decision on what they 
will construct. At that point in time, we can then follow the provision of the Declaration 
and allocate an interest in the common areas to those future units on the basis of their 
actual constructed square footage. 
Utah Code Ann., Section 57-8-3(2), states, '"'Association of Unit Owners" means 
all of the unit owners: (a) acting as a group in accordance with the declaration and 
bylaws; or (b) organized as a legal entity in accordance with the declaration." ( emphasis 
added) There is nothing in the definition cited by Criterium that requires an association 
of unit owners to recognize some participation or voting rights in the association with 
respect to landowners who merely have the potential to build units within the 
condominium project. Section 57-8-3 (2) 1s merely a definition for an 
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"association." The definition expressly defers to the prov1s1ons of the applicable 
declaration with respect to whatever organization or action that association may take. 
The Act provides the definition for a "condominium unit" in Section 57-8-
3(11). Section 57-8-3(11) expressly states that "any reference in this chapter to a 
condominium unit includes both a physical unit together with its appurtenant undivided 
interest in the common areas and facilities ... " ( emphasis added) Thus, the definition of 
a condominium unit requires the physical existence of a unit. A hypothetical unit cannot 
have an actual physical location, particularly where it is supposed to be on the third 
floor of a non-existent building.1 
To the extent that Criterium has an ascertainable interest in the common areas, 
both the Declaration and the Act require that Criterium be charged with its proportionate 
share of common expenses. Utah Code Ann., Section 57-8-24 provided, "The common 
profits of the property shall be distributed among, the common expenses shall be 
charged to, and the voting rights shall be available to, the unit owners according to their 
respective percentage or fractional interest m the common areas and 
facilities." Therefore, the Act was clear that the responsibility for common expenses 
and the voting rights available to a unit owner are inextricably tied to the respective 
percentage interest in the common areas assigned to an individual unit by the 
Declaration. Criterium cannot have any voting right in the Association unless it also 
accepts liability for the common expenses of the Association. 
1 The hypothetical units in this case are distinguishable from an undeveloped lot, which can at least be represented 
. by a physical piece of ground. Virtually all of the hypothetical units in this case would necessarily exist in what is 
currently airspace. 
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In the District Court, Criterium actually conceded to their responsibility for the 
common expenses of the Association. Criterium cited Utah Code Ann., Section 57-8-24 @ 
and made the argument that the Act made it mandatory that if a unit owner is allocated an 
interest in the common areas, then they also have corresponding rights and liabilities in 
the same proportion with respect to the Association. Thus, if the Court agrees with 
Criterium that they should be allocated a specific interest in the common areas, then by 
Criterium's own reference to Section 57-8-24 and their pleadings in response to 
Defendant's Counterclaim, this Court must allocate to Criterium as a matter of law the 
same percentage of liability for common expenses incurred by the Association. 
Ill. THE PROVISIONS OF THE DECLARATION ARE SUPPORTED BY THE CASE 
LAW. 
The Act and the holdings in Country Oaks and B Investment LC are consistent fi,; 
with the Declaration's requirement that units be physical structures. The provisions of 
the Act expressly allowed a declaration to require that a condominium unit be a physical 
structure. Prior to the 2016 Amendment, Section 57-8-3(36) (2013) provided in pertinent 
part, "(36) "Unit" means either a separate physical part of the property intended for any 
type of independent use, including one or more rooms or spaces located in one or more ~ 
floors or parts of floors in a building or a time.unit, as the context may require." The 
Act's definition of a "condominium unit" further supports the principal that a declaration 
may require a unit to be a physical structure. Section 57-8-3 (11) (2014) provided: 
( 11) "Condominium Unit" means a unit together with the undivided interest 
in the common areas and facilities appertaining to that unit. Any reference 
in this chapter to a condominium unit includes both a physical unit together 
with its appurtenant undivided interest in the common areas and facilities 
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and a time period unit together with its appurtenant undivided interest, 
unless the reference is specifically limited to a time period unit. 
B. Investment LC v. Anderson, 2012 UT App 24, 270 P.3d 548 arose from a 
dispute over rights to a stretch of beach at Bear Lake. Id. at ,r I. The beachfront property 
was part of highbred condominium project that included both traditional condominium 
units and lots intended or single-family dwellings. Id. The owners of the traditional 
condominium units (the "Condo Owners") brought suit against the declarant, the owners 
association, and the owners of the single-family lots (the "Lot Owners") for payment of 
their share of common expenses. Id. The issue before the trial court was whether the 
condominium declaration or the plat map governed the ownership of the beach. Id. at ~ 
2. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Lot Owners and the Condo 
Owners appealed. This court began by noting that the declaration of that case would be 
interpreted using the same rules as a contract. Id. at iI 9. The court concluded that the 
Act resolved any conflict between the declaration and the plat and that the declaration 
defined the unit owner's relative interests in the beach by stating, "Each unit owner shall 
be entitled to an undivided interest in the common areas and the facilities in the 
percentages or fractions expressed in the declaration." That being the case the court ruled 
that the declaration permitted the Lot Owners and the Condo Owners to have equal 
undivided interest in the beach area. The court also resolved the argument of the Condo 
Owners regarding the application of Country Oaks decision by stating that that case stood 
for the proposition that the declarants have "a measure of latitude in defining a unit." Id. 
at ,r 19. Specifically, the court noted that the Country Oaks definition of a unit was 
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supported by the provision of the Act providing that a unit be "physical." Id. at ,r 19. 
The court also noted that the Act defined the term "unit" to include "a separate physical G 
part of the property intended for any type of independent use, including one or more 
rooms or spaces located in one or more floors or part or parts of floors in a building .... " 
Id. at ,r 21. (quoting§ 57-8-3(27) (2011)). The court declared this definition could not be 
reasonably read to categorically exclude a vacant lot or a single-family dwelling from the 
definition of a "unit." Id. at ,r 22. Thus, this court has interpreted the Act to provide 
broad latitude to a condominium declarant in defining the term "unit" in a declaration. 
The court noted that the vacant lots designated by the declaration in that case 
were "a separate physical part of the property intended for any type of independent use, § 
57-8-3(27) (2001); the Act's definition of "property" included land without a building on 
it(§ 57-8-3(23)); and that each such lot is a "unit" .... not contained .... in a building." 
§ 57-8-13(l)(a)(iv) (2010). The court also ruled that the amended declaration's definition 
of unit, in that case, was sufficiently consistent with the Act to meet the standards set in Q 
Country Oaks Condominium Management Committee v. Jones, 851 P .2d 640 (Utah 
1993). B. Investment LLC v. Anderson, 2012 UT App 24, ,r 22. 
IV. THE 2016 AMENDMENT DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE. 
The rules of statutory interpretation require that the version of the Act in effect at 
the time this claim was filed govern this appeal. Archer v. Utah State Land Board, 15 
Utah 2d 321, 324, 392 P.2d 622, 624 (1964). "It is well established that the courts of this 
state operate under a statutory bar against the retroactive application of newly codified 
laws and, therefore, parties' substantive rights and liabilities are determined by the law in 
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place at the time when a cause of action arises." Waddoups v. Noorda, 2013 UT 64, ,r 6, 
321 P .3d 1108 ( quoting State v. Clark, 2011 UT 23, iJ if 11-12, 251 P .3d 829) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The Utah Legislature has declared, "A provision of the Utah 
Code is not retroactive, unless the provision is expressly declared to be retroactive." 
Utah Code § 68-3-3 (2016). This provision constitutes "a statutory bar against the 
retroactive application of newly codified laws." Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2015 UT 
App 192,117,357 P.3d 586 (quoting State v. Clark, 2011 UT 23, ,r 11,251 P.3d 829). 
There is only one exception to this general prohibition. An amendment applies 
retroactively if the provision is expressly declared to be retroactive. Utah Code § 68-3-3; 
State v. Perez, 2015 UT 13, ,r 9, 345 P.3d 1150 ("[t]he sole exception spelled out 
explicitly by statute requires an express provision for retroactivity." Id.) Utah appellate 
courts have examined the requirements for an express retroactivity provision. In 
Waddoups v. Noorda, 2013 UT 64, 321 P.3d 1108, the Utah Supreme Court was asked to 
determine whether an amendment barring causes of action for negligent credentialing 
retroactively barred the plaintiff's cause of action filed prior to the amendment. The 
Supreme Court began by interpreting Section 68-3-3 as barring any retroactivity of a 
statutory amendment, "absent clear legislative intent to the contrary .... " Id. at iJ 6. The 
Supreme Court next turned to the rules of statutory interpretation and examined the text 
of the statute, because "it is axiomatic that the best evidence of legislative intent is the 
plain language of the statute itself." Id. The Supreme Court noted that the statutory 
language in question constituted a single sentence and that the phrase contained no words 
indicative of retroactive application, nor did any language appear that supported a "clear 
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and unavoidable implication that the statute operates on events already past." Id. at if 7. 
The court next noted that both of the verbs appearing in the sentence were present tense G:) 
and determined that the use of the present tense could not communicate "a clear and 
unavoidable implication that the statute operates on events already past." Id. Lacking 
any clear and unavoidable implication that the legislature meant the provision to be 
retroactive, the Waddoups court found that the statute was, in fact, not retroactive in its 
application to the case before it. 
In the present case, appellant points to the amended Section 57-8-24(3)(b) (2016) 
as the provision making the 2016 Amendments retroactive. Like the provision in 
Waddoups, this provision is only one sentence which states: 
(b) Subsection (3)(a) applies to a condominium project regardless of when 
the condominium projects initial declaration was recorded. ~ 
Following the rules of statutory interpretation, the plain language of the statute contains 
no provision making it retroactively applicable to causes of action filed before the 
effective date that the 2016 Amendment was signed into law. Even though it makes 
subsection (3)(a) applicable to a "condominium project's initial declaration" regardless of 
when the declaration was recorded, the verb used for that action is "applies," a present xv 
tense verb only acts from the time that it was enacted going forward exactly as the 
Waddoups court determined. Considering this subsection 57-8-24 (3)(b) by its plain 
terms one cannot conclude that it clearly and unavoidably requires retroactive application 
to a lawsuit for breach of contract which accrued two years prior to the amendment. 
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The reason for the law makes common sense. When the current lawsuit was filed, 
the rights of the parties were fixed by the laws that existed at the time. Both of the parties 
made it a decision to litigate the cause of action for breach of contract brought by 
Criterium on the basis of the laws as they existed at the time. That matter was resolved 
by the District Court in favor of the Defendants. That is why both the facts and the law in 
a given lawsuit are to be applied as the date of the filing of the original complaint. 
When laws change, parties typically adjust their response to accommodate the new laws. 
That is true in the present case, as well. After the legislature adopted the amendment, the 
Association interpreted of the 2016 Amendment to mean that the Declaration would 
thereafter be interpreted in accordance with the 2016 Amendment. The Association, 
therefore, informed Criterium that it believed that Criterium had an interest in the 
common areas under the 2016 Amendment, and that on the basis of Criterium' s interest 
of the common areas that it was liable for assessments for its proportionate share of 
common expenses. Thus, under the circumstances today, there is a very different factual 
relationship between the parties. The parties will approach their relationship from a 
different posture which, hopefully, will not result in litigation at all. Nonetheless, it can 
still be said that at the time Criterium filed the original lawsuit the Association was 
correct in its interpretation of the Declaration and the law applicable to the case. 
Therefore, it would be inappropriate to change the outcome of that case by retroactively 
applying a statute which by its own language does not expressly dictate retroactive 
application to parties who are following the law as it existed before the 2016 Amendment 
was adopted. 
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Application of this principle is explained by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. 
Perez, 2015 UT 13, 345 P.3d 1150. In that case, the court analyzed amendments to the 
Indigent Defense Act ("IDA"). Id. at ,r. 1. The court noted that "the line between 
substance and procedure is not ultimately an exception to the rule against retroactivity, it 
is simply a tool for identifying the relevant 'event' being regulated by the law in question 
.... " Id. at ,r 11. The court ruled that the key question is the identification of the 
relevant event being regulated by the law in question. Id. at ,r 12. Since the amendment 
to the IDA governed the administration and availability of a publically funded attorney 
for the defendant, the event governed by the amendment was the defendant's request for 
publically appointed counsel. Id. at ,r 13. Since his motion requesting the provision of 
defense resources occurred prior to the date of the amendment of the statute, his right to 
those resources fully vested prior to the amendment and the amendment had no 
retroactive effect and did not govern his request. Id. at ,r,r 13-15. 
Nonetheless, even if the 2016 Amendment were determined to be applicable to the Q 
present appeal, Section 57-8-24(2) (2016) provides, "An association of unit owners shall, 
according to each unit owner's respective percentage or fractional undivided interest in 
the common areas and facilities: ... assess the unit owners property common expenses .. 
. . " This provision unambiguously provides that unconstructed units are subject to 
assessment based on their respective percentage or fractional interest in the common 
areas. Thus, if Criterium has any interest in the common areas, it has a corresponding 
liability for the assessment of common expenses. 
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Criterium's liability for common expenses is not diminished in any way by the 
provisions of the Declaration. Section 5.01 of the Declaration expressly provides, "Every 
Person who is the Owner of a Unit, including Declarant, shall be subject to assessments 
and shall be a Member of the Association." Secto5.02 further provides, "At any meeting 
of the Association the Allocated Interest allocated to a Unit may be voted in connection 
with issues presented to the Owners for vote. Section 1.01 ( c) defines, "Allocated Interest 
has the "undivided right, title and interest (the "Interest") ( expressed as a fraction or 
percentage in this Declaration) in the Common Areas, the Common Expenses, and votes 
in the Association allocated to each Unit." Thus, the Declaration clearly provides that 
each Owner is responsible to pay its proportionate share of all Assessments as allocated 
pursuant to the applicable Units interest in the common areas. Thus, regardless of the 
applicability of the 2016 Amendment, Criterium cannot have it both ways. Either they 
had an interest in the common areas and they are liable for their proportionate share of 
assessments, or they had no interest in the common areas. 
It should also be noted that the arguments raised in the Amicus brief filed in this 
action are moot. On the one hand the Amicus appears to be requesting an inappropriate 
advisory opinion concerning how it should handle the allocation of taxable interests 
relative to common areas of a condominium project, which is not a controversy before 
this Court. And on the other hand, the 2016 Amendment essentially assures that such an 
issue will not arise in the future. Consequently, Appellees will not respond further to the 
concerns raised by the Amicus. 
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V. AS THE PREVAILING PARTIES IN THIS CASE, THE AWARD OF 
ATTORNEYS' FEES TO THE DEFENDANTS SHOULD BE UPHELD. 
Paragraph 17.02 of the Declaration provides that attorneys' fees shall be awarded 
to the prevailing party in any dispute. With respect to the lawsuit filed by Criterium 
against the Building 1 Owners, those claims have been dismissed and have not been 
appealed. Therefore, regardless of the outcome of the appeal, the Building 1 Owners are 
still entitled to all of their attorneys' fees awarded by the District Court. Likewise, the 
claims against the Managers were dismissed by the District Court and have not been 
appealed. Therefore, the Managers are entitled to all of their attorneys' fees as awarded 
by the District Court. As the prevailing party of this appeal, the Association is also 
entitled to its attorneys' fees incurred with respect to the ongoing dispute between the 
parties. The outcome of this appeal will either be upholding the decision made by the 
District Court resulting in the final dismissal of Criterium' s breach of contract claims, 
filed in May 2014; or if this Court determines either under the Act or the 2016 
Amendments that Criterium is entitled to an interest in the common areas, membership in 
the Association, voting rights and is correspondingly liable for its share of common 
expenses, then the case must be remanded to the District Court to determine the amount Q 
of the common expenses for which Criterium is liable. A substantial money judgment in 
favor of the Association will be entered, and the Association will be entitled to its 
attorneys' fees as the prevailing party. 
CONCLUSION 
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Appellees respectfully request that this Court deny Criterium's appeal. If for any 
reason this Court determines that Criterium was entitled to an order in the District Court 
allocating an interest in the common areas to Criterium, then this Court should also hold 
that Criterium is liable to the Appellees for Criterium's proportionate share of the 
common expenses. As discussed above, Appellees respectfully request that this Court 
also identify them as the prevailing parties entitled to their attorneys' fees with respect to 
this appeal. 
DATED this --Z ( day of August, 2016. 
Attorney for Appellants 
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